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In a decision process (gambling or dynamic programming problem) with finite state space and 
arbitrary decision sets (gambles or actions), there is always available a Markov strategy whieh 
uniformly (nearly) maximizes the average time spent at a goal. Jf the decision sets are closed. 
there is even a stationary strategy with the same property. 
Examples are given to show that approximations by discounted or tinite horizon payoffs are 
not useful for the general average ri~ward problem. 
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1. Introduction 
The subject of this paper is finite state, di~crete time decision processes with single 
fixed goals and arbitrary decision sets (all to be defined precisely in Section 2). 
Various objective functions associated with such ;>Tocesses have been studied 
extensively, among them: maximizing the probability of reaching the goal 
[7,8,15,19,20]; minimizing the expected time or cost to the goal 
[4, 5, 12, 13, 16, 17]~ maximizing the expected total number of times at the goal 
[15]; maximizing the expected total discounted rewards at the goal [2,6, 13, 16]; 
maximizing the probability the goal is hitinfmitely often [7, 11, 19,20]; and maximiz­
ing the expected average time at the goal [3,6,10, 13, 16]. We are concerned here 
with this last objective; finite state goal problems with average reward criterion, 
In the pioneering work of Howard [141, and much of the subsequent research, 
e.g. Ross [16], the assumption of finiteness of number of gambles available at each 
point was essential, and led to constructive determinations of an optimal stationary 
strategy. If the number of gambles at some states are infinite, however, optimal 
strategies need not exist, and station3i'y strateg.es are not at all good in general. 
Ross [16, p. 144] has raised the question of determining the smallest class of strategies 
which are e-optimal for average reward problems. This problem has been studied 
by Chitashvili [3] and Fainberg [10]. It is the purpose of this paper to completely 
answer that question in the case of finite state goal problems. 
It is shown in Theorem I that in every such problem with closed sets of gambles 
there always exists a stationary strategy which is uniformly e-optimal; this result is 
used to show (Theorem 2) that in the finite state goal problem with arbitrary decision 
slets there always exists a Markov strategy which is uniformly nearly optimal. 
Examples are given to show that the relationship between these average reward 
problems, and problems with discounted or finite horizon objectives, is not very close. 
2. Statements of results 
Definition 2.1. As in [4], a finite state goal problem is a triple (X. r. g). where X 
l!oo a finite set, r associates to each point x E X a nonempty collection r(x) of 
probability measures on X, and g E X is a distinguished element of X. 
The set X represents the state space or fortune space of the process, F(x) the 
actions or gambles available at the state x, and g the 'goal' state. 
Much of the notation will follow that of Dubins and Savage [7]. The Dirac 
delta-measure at x will be denoted by S(x). A strategy is a function from finite 
sequences in X (including the empty sequence '0') to probability measures on X. 
The same symbol. u, will be used to denote both a strategy and the probability 
measure generated by u on the product sigma-algebra on X'" (X endowed with 
the discrete sigma algebra). E"f will denote the integral of f with respect to CT. A 
.stTareg)' (T in rat x. written u E Fj x. is a strategy CT such that u(r/J) E r(x), and 
17( XI.' ..• x.. )E r(x,,} for all XI. Xb ... X" E X and all n E N. A strategy a is Markov 
if 17(x! •...• x,,)=u(x; •...• x;.> whenever X,,=X~, and is stationary if 
u(x••...• x,,) =CT(X;, ... •x~J whenever x" = x:w The conditional strategy given 
x, •...• x'" lTLxh""X,,], is defined by CT[X" ...• xn](x)=u(Xt •... ,x",x). For a 
function r from X to subsets of probability measures on X, r, the closure of r, is 
the function defined -by t(x) =nx) for all x. where S is the total-variation norm 
closure of the set of measures 8. 
Definition 2.2. N(tJl:X~~-+{O. 1. .... n} is the function 
that i... the numher of times the goal is visited in the first 11 steps of the game. 
Definition 2.3. The hitting time of C eX. 1(", is defined hy Tc(x l, X2,' •• ) 0:: 
mint j: x, E C} if such a j exists. and =00 otherwise. The time between the t1 - Jst 
and nth viJilS to the goal. T". is defined inductively by To:=;; O. and 
T"f.{,.x!.... ),,-;min{j: 1:, J(x,.x!....)=k and Xk'J::::g} 
if "uch OJ I exi ...ts. and ==.x. otherwise. 
Definition 1.4. For a strategy cr, the expected average time at the goal usin.g u, A(u). 
is defined to be A(cr) =Eu(lim sup N(n)/ n), and the maximal expected average 
time at the goal starting at state x, A(x), is A(x) =sup{A(u): crE r/ x}. 
Definition 1.5. Let A .. A 2 , A 3 be the functions 




A 3(u) =limsup Eu(N(n)/n),
 
n 
and similarly let 
Aj(x)=sup{Aj(u): O'Er/X}. 
Remark. In most of the previous research on average reward problems the payoffs 
A 2 and A] have been used, apparently for mathematical expediency. The average 
reward criterion A(u) defined above seems more natural to th? authors, and in any 
event it turns out (Corollary following Theorem 2) that these criteria are equivalent 
for finite state problems. 
The following theorem,. the· main result of this paper, states that in every finite 
state goal problem with closed (hence compact) sets of gambles, there always exists 
a stationary strategy which is uniformly nearly optimal. 
Theorem 1. If (X, r, g) is any goal problem with IXI < 00 and rex) closed for all 
x, then for each e> 0 there is a stationary strategy 0''' in r satisfying A (aexTx]) ~ 
A(x) - E. for all x EX. 
A version of Theorem 1 for the payoff A 2 is a special case of a result of Chitashvili 
[3] and one for payoff A 3 is a special case of the work of Fainberg [10]. (See also 
Chapter 7 of Dynkin and Yushkevich [9],) These authors consider the general 
average reward problem for finite X and compact rex) and exploit the relationship 
between the l3-discounted payoff and the average reward payoff. This approach 
won't work for payoff A. As the following example, which is similar to example 3 
of Bather [2], shows even if the limit of good (discounted or finite horizon) strategies 
exist, this limiting strategy may be wort:lles<; in all respects. 
Example. X ={a, b, g}; 
r(g)={5(g)}, r(b)={()(b)}, 
}'(a ) ={5 (g) / n + 0 ( b)In 2+ (1 - 1/ n - 1/ n 2) 8 (a ): n ~ I} u { (j ( a )}. 
As f3 ~ 1, the limit of good strategies for the l3-discounted re\:ard problem exists, 
and in fact is the stationary strategy which uses B( a) at state'a', Similarly for the 
limit. as n ~ 00. of strategies which are good for the n-step problem. But using 8(a) 
always at state •a' will never lead to the goal. 
Theorem 2. If (X, r, g) is any goal problem with IXI < 00, then for each E > 0 there 
is a MarkotJ strategy un! in r satisfying A(um[x]) ~ A(x) - I> for all x EX. 
Theorem 1 and the proof of Theorem 2 yield the following corollary. 
Corollary. If (X, J~ g) is a goal problem with IXI < 00, then 
A(x) = AI(x) = A:!(x) =AJ(x) for all x EX. 
3. Proofs 
The proof pf Theorem 1 requires several lemmas. The first is an easy exercise. 
Lemma I 
N(n)
Iimsup ml( 1'1 + ... + Tm ) =Iimsup--. 
"J .,.:. n·"'",r n 
Lemma 2. If IXI <00 and r= f: then 
lim [inr{E,,( T. 1\ M): V' E 1'1 x}] = inf{E,,( 1'.): a El'l x}; 
,\f _1­
here, a 1\ h:= mine a, b). 
Proof. ',.,,;:' Trivial. since E,,( 1') /I M) ~ E,,( 7'.) for all a and all M. 
. ~. Let lim:\1_~\.[inf{E<T(1'1/1M): O'Erlx}]=a. If a =+00, then we are done. so 
suppose a < 00 and fix F > O. Note that 
inC{ 1:"" ( 1'1 1\ /I): 0' E r/ x} is nondccreasing in n, and bounded ahove by a. 
(l) 
For each II = I. 2. _. _pick 0'" E 1"1 x satisfying 
E".( T, /I n) < a + F:. (2) 
Since the number of finite sequences in X is countable. and T(x) is compact for all 
t. fhac exist<; a \ubscqucnce {an,} and (T E r/ x such that 
lim (J'''k -= a. (3) 
~ .,: 
Since £ was arbitrary, the proof will be complete once it is shown that 
EcA T I ) < a +3£. (4) 
Case 1. Ea ( Tt ) < 00. Pick M so that 
BrAT,1I M) ~ ErATt ) - E. (5) 
By (3) we can pick K ~ M so that 
E (T, II M) ~ EC7 (T} f\ M) - $. (6)UK 
Since K ~ M, it follows that 
EUK (T, II K) ~ EUt< (T, II M). (7) 
Hence 
a +e> E"'J( (T) II K) ~ EUJ( (T11\ M) ~ EC7 ( 1'1 1\ M) - E ~ EfA 1'1} - 2£, 
where the inequalities follow from (2), (7), (6) and (5) respectively. This completes 
Case 1. 
Case 2. Err ( T,) = 00. Pick M so that b"".r( Tt 1\ M) ~ a +1, and pick K ~ M as in 
(6). Then 
a + E ~ E17J( (1'. II K) ~ E eT,.; (T) 1\ ,\1) - E ~ E lT ( 1'1 AM) - ea +1- e 
(by (2), (7), (6) and choice of M), a contradiction for e<~. Thus E..(1'.) <00 
(assuming a < (0) and case 1 applies. This completes the proof. 0 
Lemma 3. Let M be finite and define T;:= T; /I M. If ErA 1';) ~ a for all a in rat g, 
then 
liminf(T; +... + 1'~)1 n? a a.s. a for all (T in rat g. 
"1_00 
Proof. Fix a in r at g. Let Fo ={4>, X N}, and for It ~ 1, let Fn be the sigma-fk:ld 
generated by T;, ... , T~. Then Yj =T;- Eu (T:lFi-') is a martingale difference 
sequence satisfying IYil ~ 1'; ~ M almost surely. Consequently, 0/nn=~=, Yj -+ 0 
almost surely. Since E..(TjIFj_.)? a almost surely, it follows that 
liminf( T; + ... + 1'~)/ n = liminf{(L. r { 1'; IFn) + ... +E,r( T;,IF" d)1 n} ~ a 
n-OC Il-~ 
a.s. (T. 
Lemma 4. If Ix1< 00 and r =J" then 
limsup N(n)/ n ~ (inf{ElT ( 1'1): (T ':: r/g}r 1 a.s. (T for all a in rat g. 
"""00 
Proof. Let inf{Eu(1',): aE r/g}= a. 
Case 1 a < 00. Fix E > O. By Lemma 2 it is possible to find MEN so that 
inf{EA1'] /I M): (T E r/ g} ~ a-E. Now define 1'~:= T; 1\ M. We have, t:y Lemma 3. 
liminf(TI + ... + 1'h)/n ~ liminf(T; +... + T~)/n ~ a - E 
0 
almost surely for all u in r at g. Thus, by Lemma 1, 
N(n). I limsup--~ (a - F)- (8) 
'l·~>: n 
almost surely for all u in r at g. Since E > 0 was arbitrary, the desired conclusion 
follows from (8). 
Case 2 a =00. Then E
rT ( T I ) = 00 for all U E rj g, and it follows easily from Lemmas 
1,2 and 3 as in Case 1 that lim N(n)jn=O a.s. for all UE rig. 0 
Proof of Theorem 1. Let ;nf{E,,( T]): u E r;g} =a. If a =+00, then by Lemma 4 
A(g) =() and hence A(x) =0 for all XE X. But then every strategy, in particular 
every stationary strategy, is (trivially) optimal. 
Suppose a < 00 and fix e > O. By [4, Theorem 4.1] there is a stationary strategy 
(T" in r satisfying 
(9) 
Let C c X be the closed communicating class relative a""" containing g (which 
is dearly recurrent). By [7, Theorem 3.9.2] there is a stationary strategy (TX''' in r 
satisfying 
(T' "[ X ]( 7~- < ,Xl) ::?' sup{0'( Tc < (0): U E 1'/x} - £ for all x E X. (l 0) 
Define the stationary strategy (Tx in r by u""(x) =u"'(x) if x E C, and = (ix·,,(x) 
if x f!. C. The remainder of the proof consists in showing that for any strategy If in 
r at x, fT' sati:-.fics 
A(a'[x])?-A((T)-·2F. (11) 
Fix (T E 1"/ x. By [16, Theorem 4.71, (9), (10) and the fact that a? 1, it follows that 
A( (T°Tx]) :;;: u"""[x]( Tc < ro)[E,r'I.t:J( T, )]-1 ::?' (T-"'//[x]( Tc < (0) . a-' J - E 
~ (T( Tt.. < (0) . a·· I - 21'. 
Since A( if' "": (1'( T1 < (0) . A(g) ~ if( 1~ < (0)' A(g). and since 0,::; A ~~ I. tile 
inequality in (11) follows hy Lemma 4. This completes the proof. 0 
In Howard's treatise [14]. where l'(x) is finite for all .t, a 'policy-improvement' 
algorithm b given which converges to that stationary strategy which is optimal 
among all stationary strategies. Theorem 1 implies that the resulting stationary 
Siratcgy of Howard's technique is optimal even among all strategies. 
For the proof of Theorem 2 we use 
"emma 5. J( iX I<: X', then for every if E r I x and each f' > 0 there is a (T E F/ x with 
I: (T - iT Ii <' r. :\10reove" if iT is stationary. then a cau be chosen to he Markov. 
Proof. Fix e > 0, and pick u(0) so that IICT(0) - 17(0)11 < e/2. For each finite sequence 
Xto X2" .• ,Xn of elements in X, pick O'(XI, ••. ,xn ) E r(xn ) so that !!f]"' Xl" •• ,xn )­
U(Xt> ... ,xn )II<F/2"+l[XI"+'. If u is stationary, pick O'(XI, •..• Xi .) so that 
U(Xb' .. , Xn ) =O'(x~, . .. ,x~) whenever Xn =x~. It is easy to verify that the strategy 
0' so chosen satisfies II u- u II < e, and is Markov if u is stationary. 0 
Proof of Theorem 2 completed. Fix E > 0, and let A be that for the problem 
(X,f,g), that is, A(x)=sup{A(CT): O'Ef/x}. By Theorem 2 there is a stationary 
strategy u oo in f satisfying A(uOO[x]) ~ A(x) - E for all x E X. By Lemma 5 there 
exists a Markov strategy urn in r with II urn - 0"-:'11 < E. Since 0 ~ A ~ A ~ 1, urn 
satisfies 
A(um[x]) ~ A(uOO[x]) - e ~ A(x) - 2£ ~ A(x) - 2£ 
for all x EX. 0 
Proof of the CoroUary. Observe that. by Fatou's Lemma, A I ~ A z~ A) ~ A. Next. 
as in the proof of Theorem 2, we can find a stationary strategy u:£ in t which is 
uniformly (nearly) optimal for A. But for stationary strategies. lim N( n)/ 11 exists 
almost surely. and application of the Dominated Convergence Theorem shows 
A= A 1= A2 =A.~. Lemma 5 implies that A =A, and A, = Ai for i = 1,2,3, and this 
completes the proof. 0 
Remarks. Although A(x)=A 1(x)=A2(x)=A 3(x) for all x if IXI<oo, it is easy to 
sec that IXI<oo does not imply A(CT)=A.(u)=A2(u)=A~(u) for all U' in r 
However. the proof of Theorem 2 shows that there is always a Markov strategy 
which is uniformly (nearly) optimal with respect to A, A., A 2 • and A 3 simultaneously. 
In fact the e-optirnal strategies constructed in Theorems 1 and 2 are even easily 
seen to be persistelllly e-optimal [8], since uniformly good stationary strategies are 
automatically persistently good. 
4. Other reward criteria 
This paper leaves open the question of whether stationary strategies (in the 
IXI < 00, r = t case) and Markov strategies (ill the general IXI < 00 case) are 
uniformly adequate for the more general avprage reward problem in which reward 
r(x) is obtained at each visit to state x. ThlY suspect the answer is affirmative, but 
the techniques u~cd in these proofs do (lot (. ven clfry over in the special case of a 
goal set G c X (i.e. r(x) = 1 if x E a, =0 otherwist:), even if r == t. 
Example. X = {a, b. g, g'}; 
r(a) = {(cS(b) +8(g))/2} u {5(g'j}, n bl = {o(b)}, 
r(g) ={5(g)}, ((g') ={cS(b)}; 
and G ={g, g'l. If one is at state a, and wishes to minimize his expected time to 0, 
or maximize his probability of hitting G (approaches used in the above proofs), he 
uses ~(g'), which is bad for maximizing the average time in G. 
The relationship between the average reward criterion, and discounted or finite 
horizon reward payoffs seems to be rather weak, perhaps because for the average 
reward problem, a gambler is not penalized for 'resting' at neutral states for long 
periods initially, as long as he- ['ventually makes good decisions later. In discounted, 
or finite horizon problems, on the other hand, the gambler is penalized heavily for 
staying at worthless states for,long periods initially, but is not penalized much for 
making bad decisions in the distant future. Neither the e-optimal stationary strategies 
guaranteed by Blackwell's results [2] for the discounted reward problem, nor the 
F-optimal Markov strategies found by backward induction [6, 13] seemed useful in 
<Jnalyzing the average reward problem. 
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